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INTRODUCTION
Accounts of the troubling conditions1 inside America’s prisons, jails,
and detention centers and the government’s inhumane, at times cruel,
treatment of people who are incarcerated2 often never escape institutions’
walls. Prison systems are largely opaque3 and have few incentives for
1. See, e.g., Second Amended Complaint, Cunningham v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, No. 1:12-cv-1570 (D. Colo., June 18, 2015) (Doc. 274) (alleging
egregious violations of law with respect to the Federal Bureau of Prison’s
treatment of people with serious and acute mental illnesses confined in the federal
supermax prison known as “ADX”); Annie Correal, Frantic Inmates in Brooklyn
Jail Complain of No Heat for Days in Deep Freeze, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2019),
at A19 (reporting that a federal jail had gone without heat and power for at least
a week while temperatures fell to two degrees and incarcerated people were
without hot water, extra blankets, and light in their cells); Katherine Hawkins,
Medical Neglect at a Denver Immigration Jail, PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT
(May 21, 2019), https:// www.pogo.org/investigation/2019/05/medical-neglectat-a-denver-immigration-jail/ [https://perma.cc/EYN2-LJX2] (recounting
deficiencies in medical care and other conditions at immigration detention center).
2. See, e.g., Alene Tchekmedyian, Women in Jail Endured Group Strip
Searches. L.A. County to Pay $53 Million to Settle Suit, L.A. TIMES (July 16,
2019),
https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-lasd-womens-jail-settle
ment-20190716-story.html [https://perma.cc/SN3F-7W6U] (reporting case in
which prison officials intentionally ignored safety risks to prisoner–plaintiff,
resulting in physical assault and rape of plaintiff over two days); Katie Benner &
Shaila Dewan, “Common, Cruel” Violence Met by Indifference, N.Y. TIMES
(April 3, 2019), at A1 (reporting on Department of Justice findings after
investigation into Alabama’s prison system, summarizing “[p]risoners in the
Alabama system endured some of the highest rates of homicide and rape in the
country . . . and officials showed a ‘flagrant disregard’ for their right to be free
from excessive and cruel punishment”); Jessica Pishko, At Angola Prison,
“People Are Suffering. People Are Dying,” APPEAL (Oct. 12, 2018), https://the
appeal.org/at-angola-prison-people-are-suffering-people-are-dying/ [https://perma
.cc/82FB-3F66] (reporting on class-action lawsuit in which correctional medicine
expert opined Louisiana State Penitentiary “had long neglected its duty to keep
prisoners safe”).
3. See, e.g., Laura Rovner, On Litigating Constitutional Challenges to the
Federal Supermax: Improving Conditions and Shining a Light, 95 DENV. L. REV.
457, 472 (2018) (“But accessing the sources necessary to learn about ADX can
be exceedingly difficult. For example, in its 2014 report examining the use of
solitary confinement in the federal prison system, Amnesty International
condemned both the conditions in ADX and ‘the lack of detailed publicly
available information on the facility.’ . . . Journalists similarly have been
prevented from accessing ADX.”); Andrea C. Armstrong, No Prisoner Left
Behind? Enhancing Public Transparency of Penal Institutions, 25 STAN. L. &
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transparency.4 Yet courts provide one mechanism by which first-hand
accounts of prison and jail conditions may make their way into the public
record by enabling people seeking redress for harms they have endured to
tell their accounts through pleadings and testimony. Seminal lawsuits,
from Farmer v. Brennan5 to Brown v. Plata6 to Estelle v. Gamble,7 have
helped record the history of America’s treatment of incarcerated people
and have shaped, in varying degrees, the way incarcerated and formerly
incarcerated people, prisoners’ rights advocates, and prison systems view
and approach confinement.
Much of the meaningful impact of prisoners’ suits, however, extends
only as far as the law provides redress for the people who allege violations
of their rights. Complaint screening mechanisms nearly guarantee that an
incarcerated plaintiff’s lawsuit that asserts a violation of the law for which
no remedy exists will be dismissed as frivolous, often before the case is
even docketed.8 Rigorous pleading requirements and procedural hurdles
unique to litigation regarding prison conditions often result in the
dismissal of lawsuits at early stages before the judicial system has even
afforded the plaintiffs the opportunity to present evidence in their favor.9

POL’Y REV. 435, 436 (2014) (“The public has little idea what happens behind
prison walls. Prisons and jails are essentially ‘closed institutions holding an evergrowing disempowered population.’”); Derek Borchardt, The Iron Curtain
Redrawn Between Prisoners and the Constitution, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
469, 469–70 (2012) (“For much of American history, federal courts considered
prisons’ internal operations off limits.”); David C. Fathi, The Challenge of Prison
Oversight, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1453, 1453 (2010) (“Prisons are closed
environments, largely hidden from public view.”).
4. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Dennehy & Kelly A. Nantel, Improving Prison
Safety: Breaking the Code of Silence, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 175, 176–78
(2006) (discussing “code of silence” among prison staff, wherein some staff
members “believe that what goes on behind the prison walls should remain hidden
from public knowledge,” resulting in increased violence and dangerousness of
prisons).
5. 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
6. 563 U.S. 493 (2011).
7. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
8. Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the federal district court
must review all complaints filed by incarcerated people “before docketing, if
feasible,” to ensure that the filing is not “frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (2019).
9. See generally Maureen Brocco, Facing the Facts: The Guarantee Against
Cruel and Unusual Punishment in Light of PLRA, Iqbal, and PREA, 16 J. GENDER
RACE & JUST. 917 (2013).
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The law treats incarcerated and non-incarcerated people differently. It
also affords disparate rights and remedies for people incarcerated in the
custody of state and local entities, as compared to people incarcerated in
federal custody. People who are incarcerated in state and local prisons and
jails have the robust 42 U.S.C. § 1983, among other tools, at their disposal
to seek damages and injunctive relief against state and local government
entities and prison officials. This federal statute provides a cause of action
against state and local officials and municipalities acting under color of
law for constitutional violations. Although the Prison Litigation Reform
Act and other common law doctrines, including qualified immunity,
impose a number of requirements and limitations—often significant—on
prisoners’ rights to recovery, § 1983 provides the vehicle for which people
in the custody of state and local prison systems may seek a judgment in
their favor for harms they have suffered.
A similar tool does not exist, however, at the federal level.10 The
remedies available to federal prisoners seeking to litigate violations of
their constitutional rights are quite narrow, while the federal government
has myriad tools at its disposal to attempt to evade judicial review of
claims brought by federally incarcerated people. People incarcerated in
federal prisons may seek monetary damages from the federal government
for certain injuries11 through the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)12 or
from individual government actors through the implied Bivens remedy for
certain constitutional torts.13 As current precedent stands, however, the
10. See, e.g., Allison L. Waks, Federal Incarceration by Contract in a PostMinneci World: Legislation to Equalize the Constitutional Rights of Prisoners,
46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1065, 1066–67 (2013) (“At the state level, by contrast
[to federal prisoners], public and private prisoners have superior federal rights
through remedies afforded by § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1971, which
provides a private right of action for constitutional violations committed by state
actors.”).
11. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (“FTCA”), Pub. L. No. 79-601,
tit. IV, 60 Stat. 812 (1946) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)) (providing remedy
against United States for “injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred”).
12. Id.
13. The United States Supreme Court has recognized an implied
constitutional tort remedy against federal actors in just three cases: Bivens v. Six
Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Davis v. Passman, 442
U.S. 228 (1979); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
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availability of those claims is exceedingly narrow.14 Federal prisoners may
also seek forward-looking or injunctive relief for ongoing violations of their
rights, but the nature of federal incarceration leaves the government with
several procedural means to attempt to evade review of prospective-relief
claims.15
People confined in private, for-profit prisons at the federal level are in
some ways at a greater disadvantage than their federal, public-prison
counterparts.16 The United States Supreme Court has held that federally
incarcerated people cannot sue private prison corporations or their
employees for constitutional torts. Rather, if a federal prisoner–plaintiff is
seeking damages for a past injury, the plaintiff is restricted to state tort law
for claims against the private prison and its nongovernmental staff and to
the FTCA for claims against the United States for the wrongful conduct of
its employees. For federal prisoners, these restrictions may mean that
certain injuries they suffer while incarcerated never reach a federal court
because there is no recognized remedy. These barriers restrict the ability
of incarcerated people to address past violations and mitigate the often
harsh conditions in which the federal government incarcerates people. The
restrictions also hamper the means by which many accounts of the
conditions of American incarceration are disseminated to the public,
leaving much of what happens behind prisons’ walls locked inside with
the people being confined.17 If public court filings and litigation are
mechanisms by which accounts of U.S. incarceration make their way into
the public record, and courts do not recognize a vehicle through which to

14. See generally Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017).
15. The Federal Bureau of Prisons, for example, may transfer a prisoner to
prisons across state lines and then seek to dismiss his lawsuit on venue or
jurisdictional grounds. See, e.g., Nicole B. Godfrey & Danielle C. Jefferis,
Chapman v. Bureau of Prisons: Stopping the Venue Merry-Go-Round, 96 DENV.
L. REV. ONLINE 9 (2018).
16. The fastest growing category of federally incarcerated people is those in
the so-called “civil” custody of federal immigration enforcement agencies, such
as United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement. See Danielle C. Jefferis,
Constitutionally Unaccountable: Privatized Immigration Detention, 95 INDIANA
L.J. (forthcoming 2020).
17. Increasingly, media outlets are recognizing the value in publishing firsthand accounts of prison conditions. The Marshall Project’s Life Inside series is an
example. See generally Life Inside, MARSHALL PROJECT, https://www.the
marshallproject.org/tag/life-inside [https://perma.cc/T9GB-Z3Y2] (last visited
Sept. 6, 2019). But journalists and incarcerated and formerly incarcerated people
still face significant obstacles in investigating and reporting on conditions inside
America’s prisons. See generally supra sources cited note 3.
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hear federal prisoners’ accounts, those accounts may never be heard in any
meaningful way.
This Article highlights and focuses on one discrete—but critical—way in
which the federal government attempts to evade judicial review of its conduct
with respect to the people it incarcerates: its invocation of the FTCA’s
independent-contractor exception18 when faced with federal prisoners’ claims
of inadequate medical care in private, for-profit prisons. Private prisons are
not unique to the federal prison system. Indeed, states, counties, and
municipalities rely on the contract services of corporations to operate prisons
and jails.19 Many states, however, also recognize the common law principle
that ensuring the provision of adequate medical care to incarcerated people is
a nondelegable duty of state and municipal governments.20 Under this
principle, the governmental entity contracting to operate the prison or to
provide medical care within the facility cannot evade liability for harms
relating to the provision of medical care by simply asserting that the
agreement delegated that responsibility to the contractor. These entities’ (and
courts’) recognition of this duty ensures governmental accountability for
certain harms to incarcerated people, despite the governmental entities
delegating a traditional state function—incarceration—to private businesses
designed to generate and maximize profit.
Increasingly, however, the federal government attempts to evade its
own duty of care owed to people in its custody by invoking the FTCA’s
independent-contractor exception. When people confined in federal
private prisons try to hold the federal government liable for inadequate
care they have received in those prisons, the government invokes the
exception and asserts that it cannot be liable for the conduct of a thirdparty contractor. To date, some courts have adopted this view of the
18. There is some ambiguity surrounding the source of the “independentcontractor” exception: sometimes, it is invoked via the FTCA’s definition
provisions; other times, it is raised through the substantive discretionary-function
exception. See infra Section II.B.
19. Recently, California and Illinois have enacted legislation to ban for-profit
prison companies from operating in the state. See A.B. 32, 2019 Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 2019), available at http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextCli
ent.xhtml?bill_id=201920200AB32&search_keywords=prison+private [https://
perma.cc/LG7H-MEZ9]; H.B. 2040, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2019),
available at http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocNum=2040&GA
ID=15&DocTypeID=HB&SessionID=108&GA=101 [https://perma.cc/TZX4-G
HCW].
20. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 56 (1988) (“Contracting out prison medical
care does not relieve the State of its constitutional duty to provide adequate
medical treatment to those in its custody, and it does not deprive the State’s
prisoners of the means to vindicate their Eighth Amendment rights.”).
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government’s role when relying on the services of private prisons.21 This
Article asserts that the lack of parity between the remedies that courts have
recognized as available to state prisoners and federal prisoners in private
prisons undermines the rights of people in federal custody and is contrary
to public policy: it incentivizes the federal government to contract away
the quintessential government function of incarcerating its citizens.
This Article has three parts. Part I provides necessary background
information, discussing the FTCA, its early application to prisoners’
claims, and the growth of the private prison industry. Part II describes the
applications of the independent-contractor exception to prisoners’ claims
arising out of federal for-profit prisons and contrasts the exclusion of a
remedy for those claims with similar claims brought by people
incarcerated in state and local prisons and jails. Part III concludes by
examining the nondelegable duty of care many states have recognized with
respect to the government and the people whom it incarcerates and then
asserts that Congress must enact legislation to counteract the FTCA’s
independent-contractor exception and to, therefore, bring the remedial
structures between the states and federal government in comity with one
another.
I. BACKGROUND
The federal government and its employees enjoy immunity from tort
claims arising from conduct performed while acting within the scope of
their government employment unless Congress has expressly waived that
immunity.22 To date, the nation’s most expansive waiver of that sovereign

21. See, e.g., Harvey v. United States, No. 14 Civ. 1787 (PAC), 2017 WL
2954399, at *3 (S.D.N.Y., July 10, 2017) (“The United States is not liable for
injuries caused by private jail staff because under [the independent-contractor]
exception the penal staff is not considered to be Federal employees.”). But see
Rodriguez v. United States, No. 1:13 CV 01559, 2015 WL 3645716, at *9–10
(N.D. Ohio, June 10, 2015) (citing Brown v. United States, 486 F.2d 284, 288–89
(8th Cir. 1973) (“On remand, the district court in Brown found that, although the
Bureau of Prisons had statutory authority to contract for the confinement of
federal prisoners in non-federal facilities, the BOP nonetheless had a positive duty
to exercise due care for the safety of all federal prisoners . . . ‘regardless of
whether they are confined in federal institutions or whether they are confined in
State or local jails or penal institutions.’” (emphasis added)).
22. See Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of
1988 (Westfall Act), Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2671, 2674, 2679).
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immunity is the Federal Tort Claims Act passed in 1946.23 Before the
FTCA’s enactment, the only means of monetary recovery from the
government for an injury in tort was through the passage of a private bill—
a burdensome and rigorous process.24 The FTCA streamlined the recovery
process and moved it from the legislature to the executive and judiciary.
Since its enactment, the FTCA has permitted recovery for claimants
suffering a variety of injuries caused by employees across the federal
government, including claims brought by people incarcerated in federal
prisons. This Part provides an overview of the scope of injuries the FTCA
covers and discusses the FTCA’s application to prisoners’ claims.
A. The Federal Tort Claims Act
The FTCA imposes liability on the United States for certain tort claims
in the same manner tort law provides for recovery for private litigants.25
The law does not create any new causes of action; rather, it provides a
statutory waiver of the federal government’s sovereign immunity so that
litigants may assert the equivalence of state tort claims for injuries caused
by federal employees and actors.26 Discussing the FTCA’s passage, the
Supreme Court explained:
[The FTCA] was the offspring of a feeling that the Government
should assume the obligation to pay for damages for the
misfeasance of employees in carrying out its work. And the
23. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (“FTCA”), Pub. L. No. 79-601,
tit. IV, 60 Stat. 812 (1946) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)).
24. Gregory C. Sisk, Official Wrongdoing and the Civil Liability of the
Federal Government and Officers, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 295, 295 (2011).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2019) (“The United States shall be liable, respecting
the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances . . . .”).
26. Sisk, supra note 24, at 300:
The FTCA does not create any new causes of action nor does it
formulate federal rules of substantive tort law. Instead, as the
Supreme Court explained in Richards v. United States,
Congress chose “to build upon the legal relationships
formulated and characterized by the States’ with respect to
principles of tort law. Accordingly, under § 1346(b)(1), the
United States is liable under the FTCA when ‘a private person[]
would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of
the place where the act or omission occurred.” The fundamental
principle, then, is that the tort claim alleged must be one that the
law of the pertinent state recognizes.
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private bill device was notoriously clumsy. Some simplified
recovery procedure for the mass of claims was imperative. This
Act was Congress’ solution, affording easy and simple access to
the federal courts for torts within its scope.27
The United States is the proper and sole defendant in an FTCA action; the
federal district courts retain exclusive jurisdiction; and the bench is the
factfinder and adjudicator—jury trials are not permitted.28
Although the oft-cited example of the liability Congress anticipated
when enacting the FTCA was motor vehicle accidents, FTCA lawsuits
have alleged torts committed by a range of federal agencies and
employees, including harms resulting from the allegedly wrongful arrest
and malicious prosecution of a former police officer and FBI informant,29
the reported slander of a former National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) employee,30 and the United States Customs
Service’s seizure of an aircraft and arrest of its owners.31 Incarcerated
people have also turned to the FTCA to attempt to obtain relief for harms
they claimed to have suffered while in the custody of the United States.
B. The FTCA’s Application to Prisoners’ Claims
Henry Winston was incarcerated in the United States Penitentiary in
Terre Haute, Indiana, in 1959 when he began experiencing dizziness,
instability, and difficulty with his vision.32 He requested a medical
examination by prison doctors.33 The prison doctors diagnosed him with

27. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 25 (1953).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).
29. Manning v. United States, 546 F.3d 430 (7th Cir. 2008).
30. Henson v. Nat’l Aeronautics and Space Admin., 14 F.3d 1143 (6th Cir.
1994).
31. Gasho v. United States, 39 F.3d 1420 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Sisk, supra
note 24, at 298:
Lawsuits under the FTCA have challenged the regulatory approval of the
polio vaccine by the Food and Drug Administration, the alleged
negligence of federal mine inspectors in failing to discover noncompliance with regulatory safety requirements before a mine accident,
and a multi-billion-dollar lawsuit alleging that the negligence of the
Army Corps of Engineers in failing to seek congressional appropriations
to upgrade a navigation channel adjacent to New Orleans was
responsible for exacerbating the damages caused by Hurricane Katrina.
32. Winston v. United States, 305 F.2d 253, 254–55 (2d Cir. 1962).
33. Id. at 255.
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“borderline hypertension” and recommended he lose weight.34 Mr. Winston’s
symptoms worsened, however: he experienced severe headaches and
suffered from daily attacks involving the inability to walk and vision loss.35
Mr. Winston pleaded with prison officials for medical attention.36 They
refused to schedule another examination and, instead, prescribed
Dramamine.37
In 1960, Mr. Winston’s attorney visited him and, troubled by his client’s
apparent condition, scheduled him an examination with a consulting
physician.38 A month later, Mr. Winston underwent surgery to remove a
brain tumor.39 The delay in treatment left Mr. Winston permanently blind.40
Mr. Winston sought to hold the government responsible pursuant to
the FTCA for the prison officials’ negligence in treating his medical
condition.41 The district court dismissed Mr. Winston’s complaint on the
basis that the FTCA “does not permit suits by federal prisoners against the
United States.”42 On appeal, the Second Circuit assessed whether the
FTCA excepted prisoners from the statute’s clear intent to waive the
sovereign immunity of the United States with respect to certain claims.43
The court, sitting en banc, observed, “With the passage of the [Federal]
Tort Claims Act, which by its terms does not except prisoners, it would
seem that the sole barrier to federal prisoners’ suits against the United
States had been removed.”44 But despite the statute’s clear language, the
government argued that the court should not permit prisoners’ suits against
the United States to proceed because doing so would interfere with prison
security and result in such deleterious consequences for the prison’s
operation and administration that Congress could not possibly have
intended to permit prisoners to assert claims under the law.45 The
government urged the court to conclude that the FTCA contains an implied
bar to claims brought against the United States by people who are
incarcerated.46
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
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The court rejected the government’s argument for two reasons.47 First,
in a rare showing of skepticism to the government’s argument that
prisoners’ suits threaten prison security,48 the court found “the assertions
of dire consequences” to be “overdrawn.”49 Recognizing that the law
already permitted prisoners to sue individual prison officials, the court
reasoned that there could be no worse consequences from an FTCA suit
against the United States than from a suit against an individual.50 To claim
that more serious consequences would result from a claim asserted directly
against the government was, for the court, “at best dubious.”51
Second, the court rejected the government’s argument that a prior
decision precluding FTCA claims brought by members of the Armed Forces
should be extended to prisoners’ claims. Keeping with its position that
Congress, though silent on the matter, must have intended an implied bar to
FTCA claims brought by incarcerated people, the government argued that
Feres v. United States stood for the proposition that courts may—or must—
47. In addition to the reasoning discussed, the court swiftly rejected the
government’s argument that Congress implicitly intended to except prisoners
from the FTCA’s reach because of the purported security risk to prisoner suits
against the United States, calling the argument “circular”:
The question for decision is what Congress thought and intended.
Whether discipline would be impaired is a legislative judgment. To
assert that because discipline would suffer Congress could not have
intended the result is only to say that Congress thought one thing rather
than another—which is the very question we seek to answer.
Id.
48. Federal courts are notoriously deferential to prison administrators’
positions regarding prison security. This is most visible in First-Amendment
claims arising in prisons, where the Supreme Court set forth a test that mandates
such deference. See, e.g., Evan Bianchi & David Shapiro, Locked Up, Shut Up:
Why Speech in Prison Matters, 92 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 6 (2018) (“When it comes
to judicial review of prison censorship, deference to prison officials is the order
of the day.”). But it pervades much of prison-conditions litigation. See, e.g.,
Michael Keegan, The Supreme Court’s “Prisoner Dilemma:” How Johnson,
RLUIPA, and Cutter Re-Defined Inmate Constitutional Claims, 86 NEB. L. REV.
279, 280 (2007) (“Prison rights litigation is a relatively recent phenomenon,
taking root only in the latter half of the twentieth century. Since its inception, the
Supreme Court consistently held firm on two propositions. First, prison inmates
retain the protections of the Constitution, even though they are incarcerated.
Second, corrections officials should be granted deference when dealing with the
difficult task of running a prison.”).
49. Winston, 305 F.2d at 255.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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read implied exceptions into the FTCA.52 The court was not persuaded: in
contrast with servicemembers’ claims, which would require courts to create
new remedies, prisoners’ claims would likely fall under already recognized
state tort theories.53 Although the need for remedial uniformity was strong
due to the “distinctively federal relationship between soldiers and the
government,” the court was unconvinced that the same was true for
prisoners: “[S]uch considerations are irrelevant to the government-prisoner
relationship.”54
Moreover, the court recognized that servicemembers benefited from a
Congressionally enacted system of compensation for those injured in work
activity that paralleled the remedies available under the FTCA. Prisoners,
on the other hand, did not.55 For these reasons, the court concluded that
“little remains to support an exception to the [FTCA] which Congress
wholly failed to articulate.”56 Every other federal court that asked the same
question prior to Mr. Winston’s case had relied on Feres to reach the
opposite conclusion.57 Mr. Winston became the first prisoner allowed to
52. Id. at 256.
53. Id.
The first premise of Feres was that the [Federal] Tort Claims Act, while
terminating government immunity, created no new liabilities, and that no
American law had ever permitted a soldier to recover for negligence,
against either his superior officers or the Government he is serving. Suits
by prisoners against jailers and local governments, however, had been
authorized prior to the passage of the [FTCA].)
Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
54. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court here dispensed with this
remedial uniformity premise quickly and with no analysis; however, the absence
of uniformity among the remedies available for federal prisoners is a compelling
reason for recognizing Bivens constitutional remedies.
55. Id.
But the prisoners’ compensation system extends only to prisoners
actually engaged in work in prison industry and maintenance. Many
prisoners are not so engaged at any time. And those so employed actually
work at such tasks for only a portion of the day . . . . In comparison with
the military compensation program, which affords relief for virtually all
service-incurred injuries, the prison work-compensation plan is vastly
less comprehensive and is in no real sense a substitute for tort liability.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
56. Id. at 257.
57. Recent Cases, Federal Tort Claims Act—in General—Federal Prisoner
May Sue United States for Injuries Resulting from Negligence of Prison
Physician, 76 HARV. L. REV. 413, 413–14 (1962).
Yet, irrespective of state law, every federal court to consider the question
has refused to apply the [FTCA] to federal prisoners, relying on the
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sue the United States for the negligence of federal prison employees.58 The
Supreme Court thereafter affirmed the availability of the FTCA to federal
prisoners’ claims.59 Just over a decade later, the Court would consider
whether the applicability of the FTCA to prisons included contracting
entities. The significance of the Court’s answer to that question has grown
in tandem with the expansion of the for-profit prison industry.
II. FOR-PROFIT PRISONS AND THE FTCA’S INDEPENDENT-CONTRACTOR
EXCEPTION
The FTCA waives the sovereign immunity of the United States for
torts committed by employees of any federal agency.60 In defining the term
“federal agency,” the FTCA explicitly exempts “any contractor with the

Supreme Court’s decision in Feres v. United States, which held that
actions by servicemen for the negligence of other military personnel,
including a claim for the malpractice of an army doctor, were not covered
by the [FTCA].
Id. (internal footnotes omitted).
58. Id. (“The Federal Tort Claims Act allows actions against the United States
in those situations in which parallel private claims would be cognizable under
state law; the present case sufficiently demonstrates the existence of such parallel
private liability.”).
59. United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963).
The Federal Tort Claims Act provides much-needed relief to those
suffering injury from the negligence of government employees. We
should not, at the same time that state courts are striving to mitigate the
hardships caused by sovereign immunity, narrow the remedies provided
by Congress. . . . “There is no justification for this Court to read
exemptions into the Act beyond those provided by Congress. If the Act
is to be altered that is a function for the same body that adopted it.”
Id. at 165–66 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Although the Court
has affirmed the availability of the FTCA to prisoners’ claims, courts have
systematically declined to adjudicate the merits of prisoners’ claims on the basis
of any number of exceptions or jurisdictional bars, including and in addition to
those discussed herein. See, e.g., Hatten v. White, 275 F.3d 1208, 1210 (10th Cir.
2002) (holding the FTCA inapplicable to prisoners’ loss of property claim);
Cohen v. United States, 151 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 1998) (finding the FTCA’s
discretionary-function exception barred a prisoner’s claim that prison officials
negligently assigned him to live with another prisoner who attacked him);
Thompson v. United States, 495 F.2d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 1974) (barring prisoners’
workplace injuries under the FTCA).
60. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (2019).
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United States.”61 This Part provides an overview of the for-profit prison
industry in the United States, specifically on the federal level, and then
describes how some courts have applied the FTCA’s independentcontractor exception generally and to for-profit federal prisons.
A. The Rise of For-Profit Federal Prisons
For-profit incarceration is a booming business in the United States.
The industry’s profit leaders, the GEO Group, Inc. (“GEO”) and
CoreCivic (known formerly as the Corrections Corporation of America or
CCA), have reported substantial income over the last five years. In 2017,
the GEO Group reported nearly $2.3 billion in revenue compared to $2.2
billion in 2016 and $1.8 billion in 2015.62 CoreCivic reported $1.7 billion
in revenue for 2017, with similar numbers reported in 2016 and 2015.63
The Trump administration’s immigration-enforcement policies account
for much of the companies’ recent growth because detention space
continues to rise exponentially.64 Since the 2016 presidential election,
these companies’ shareholders have seen a rapid spike in stock value with
each announcement of a new tough-on-immigration policy.65
The rise of the for-profit prison industry is inextricably linked to the
shift in law enforcement priorities, beginning with the Nixon era’s wars
on drugs and crime in the 1970s66 and the influx of migrants and refugees
in the early 1980s.67 As American society gradually took a harsher stance
61. Id. (“[T]he term ‘Federal agency’ . . . does not include any contractor with
the United States.”).
62. THE GEO GROUP, INC., 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2017).
63. CORECIVIC, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2017).
64. See, e.g., Jefferis, supra note 16.
65. See, e.g., John Washington, Trump’s Immigration Policy ‘Fever Dream,’
NATION (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/trumps-immigrationpolicy-fever-dream/ [https://perma.cc/WT7Q-K2TU] (last visited March 2, 2019)
(“[B]etween the announcement of the ‘zero tolerance’ policy and DHS’s June 22
request for information about the possibility of detaining an additional 15,000
people in family jails, the stocks of Geo Group and CoreCivic, the two largest forprofit immigration-detention corporations, increased 5.9 percent and 8.3 percent,
respectively.”). But see Danielle C. Jefferis, Private Prisons, Private Governance:
Essay on Developments in Private-Sector Resistance to Privatized Immigration
Detention, 15 NW J.L. & SOC. POL’Y (forthcoming 2019).
66. See Waks, supra note 10, at 1065. (“Beginning in the 1970s, the
government’s ‘war on drugs’ and war on crime have resulted in thousands of
additional federal convictions and imprisonments.”).
67. See, e.g., Jefferis, supra note 16; Fiona O’Carroll, Inherently
Governmental: A Legal Argument for Ending Private Federal Prisons and
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on crime and immigration, state and local governments could not keep up
with a rapidly expanding prison population.68 States quickly turned to
private prison companies;69 soon thereafter, Congress authorized the
Federal Bureau of Prisons to contract with for-profit companies to operate
prisons and detention centers.70
Allison L. Waks describes the modern scope of for-profit federal
confinement:
The modern system of incarceration in the United States has
created a massive prison population that has fueled a $3 billion
private sector prison industry. According to the Department of
Justice (DOJ), between 2000 and 2009, the number of federal
prisoners in private prisons more than doubled from 15,524 to
34,087. In 2009, 16.4 percent of federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
prisoners were housed in private facilities. This was ten times
higher than the number in 1990. Further, the number of ICE
detainees held in private prison facilities increased by 263 percent
from 1995 to 2005.71
Immigration detention has continued to balloon in recent years, with an
average of more than 50,000 people in immigration confinement each day,
and nearly 70% of those people finding themselves at one time or another
in a for-profit prison.72 The Trump administration’s reliance on
immigration detention, along with its reversal of the Obama
Detention Centers, 67 EMORY L.J. 293, 300 (2017) (“Privatization has also played
an increasingly important role in immigration detention as the population of
detainees has swelled.”).
68. See, e.g., O’Carroll, supra note 67, at 299 (“Struggling to provide
adequate facilities for a growing population of inmates, state and local
governments turned to private corrections companies in the 1980s.”).
69. Id.:
Struggling to provide adequate facilities for a growing population of
inmates, state and local governments turned to private corrections
companies in the 1980s. This response accorded with the political values
that defined the Reagan era, such as limited government and faith in the
private sector. Free market advocates promoted prison privatization as a
means of achieving greater efficiency and reducing government
bureaucracy.
70. Id. at 299–300 (“But it was not until 1996—shortly after President
Clinton declared, ‘The era of big Government is over’—that Congress expressly
authorized the BOP to contract with the private sector for the operation of
prisons.”).
71. Waks, supra note 10, at 1069–70.
72. Jefferis, supra note 16.
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administration’s policy of eliminating the use of private prisons, suggests
that for-profit confinement on the federal level will continue to grow.73
B. The Independent-Contractor Exception as Applied, Generally
As a threshold matter, there is some confusion around the source of the
independent-contractor exception. Some litigants and courts point to the
definitional provision 28 U.S.C. § 2671 when invoking the exception, which
for purposes of the FTCA defines “employee of the government” as
“officers or employees of any federal agency, members of the military or
naval forces of the United States, members of the National Guard . . . and
persons acting on behalf of a federal agency in an official capacity,
temporarily or permanently in the service of the United States . . . .” 74 The
definition expressly excludes “any contractor with the United States.”75
Others point to the FTCA’s discretionary-function exception76 to assert that
the United States cannot be liable for the conduct of independent contractors
because the government’s decision to contract with third parties is
inherently discretionary.77 Despite this confusion, the origin of the
independent-contractor exception lies with the definitional statute, § 2671.78
73. Memorandum from Attorney General Jefferson B. Sessions III,
Rescission of Memorandum on Use of Private Prisons (Feb. 21, 2017), available
at https://www.bop.gov/resources/news/pdfs/20170224_doj_memo.pdf [https://
perma.cc/ P3UR-DKMF].
74. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. United States, No. 1:13 CV 01559, 2015 WL
3645716, at *5 (N.D. Ohio, June 10, 2015) (“The [FTCA] defines ‘government
employees’ as ‘officers and employees of any federal agency.’ The definition does
not include independent contractors, nor the employees of independent
contractors.” (quoting 28 U.S.C § 2671)); United States Tobacco Coop. Inc. v.
Big South Wholesale of Virginia, LLC, 899 F.3d 236, 248 (4th Cir. 2018).
75. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (2019).
76. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (exempting from the FTCA “[a]ny claim based upon
an act or omission of an employee of the Government . . . based upon the exercise
or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or
duty . . .”).
77. See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of the United States’ Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Keyes v. United States, No. 1:18cv-1469, (D. Co. 2018) (Doc. 19). In a case considering a federal pretrial
detainee’s allegations under the FTCA of medical negligence he suffered while
confined in a for-profit prison contracting with the U.S. Marshals Service, the
United States argued that its “decision to contract with [a private prison company]
is quintessentially a discretionary decision, for which liability is barred by the
discretionary function exception.” Id. at 14.
78. See United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 813–14 (1976) (citing
Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 30–31 (1953); Logue v. United States, 412
U.S. 521, 528 (1973)).
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Courts’ application of the FTCA’s independent-contractor exception
generally tracks common law principles of principal–agent relationships.79
In United States v. Orleans, for example, the Supreme Court analyzed the
application of the exception to a claim brought against a community action
agency operating pursuant to a congressional act and with federal
government funding.80 In evaluating the relationship between the nonprofit agency and the federal government, the Court recognized the
substantial amount of money the federal government spends on contracted
projects each year, noting the contractors are paid by the United States but
are largely free to implement their contracts as they choose.81 This degree
of freedom to act on the part of the contractor was key for the Court: “The
Federal Government in no sense controls ‘the detailed physical
performance’ of all the programs and projects it finances by gifts, grants,
contracts, or loans.”82 When the contracting agency has complete control
over its activities, the FTCA’s independent-contractor exception must
apply.83
Soon after the Winston decision, which recognized a cause of action
against the United States under the FTCA for people confined in federal
prisons, the question of the independent-contractor’s application to the
conduct of private prisons and their employees came before the Court.
C. The Exception as Applied to For-Profit Prisons
In 1973, the Supreme Court considered the application of the FTCA’s
independent-contractor exception to a prisoner’s claim for the first time in
Logue v. United States.84 The case did not concern a federal prisoner
housed in a for-profit prison but, rather, a federal prisoner held in a county
jail pursuant to a contract between the county and the Bureau of Prisons.85
79. See, e.g., Orleans, 425 U.S. 807.
80. Id. at 809.
81. Id. at 815.
82. Id. at 816 (quoting Logue, 412 U.S. at 528).
83. Id. at 818 (“Nothing could be plainer than the congressional intent that
the local entities here in question have complete control over operations of their
own programs with the Federal Government supplying financial aid, advice, and
oversight only to assure that federal funds not be diverted to unauthorized
purposes.”).
84. 412 U.S. 521 (1973).
85. Id. at 523:
After a hearing, [Mr. Logue] was taken to the Nueces County jail in
Corpus Christi, Texas, to await trial. This jail is one of some 800
institutions operated by state and local governments that contract with
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On the second day of his incarceration in the county jail, Mr. Logue
attempted to commit suicide.86 After receiving treatment in a non-prison
hospital emergency room, he was admitted to the hospital’s psychiatric
floor. Mr. Logue’s treating physician recommended to federal officials
that he be incarcerated in a medical facility for rehabilitation.87 The next
day, the district court ordered federal officials to comply with the doctor’s
recommendation and transfer Mr. Logue to a medical facility.88
Federal officials, however, moved Mr. Logue back to the county jail
to await the processing of his transfer paperwork.89 These officials notified
the administration of the contracting jail of Mr. Logue’s condition and
requested that the administration assign Mr. Logue to a cell removed of all
items that may pose a risk.90 The federal officials made no arrangements
with the jail administration to observe Mr. Logue, and jail staff checked
on Mr. Logue only periodically “when they were on that floor for some
other reasons.”91 The next day, Mr. Logue killed himself.92
Mr. Logue’s parents sued the United States under the FTCA for
damages relating to their son’s death, claiming that the federal officials’
negligence was the proximate cause of Mr. Logue’s death.93 To account
for the contractor relationship of the jail, they presented alternate theories:
either the jail was a federal agency within the FTCA’s meaning, or the jail
employees were “acting on behalf of” the federal government when
performing services for federal prisoners.94
Turning to common law principles, the Court rejected both arguments.
As the Court had recognized in previous cases, the difference between a
principal–agent relationship and an independent contractor “turn[s] on the
absence of authority in the principal to control the physical conduct of the
contractor in performance of the contract.”95 There was no evidence that
the federal officials had any power or authority to control the operations

the Federal Bureau of Prisons to provide for the safekeeping, care, and
subsistence of federal prisoners.
86. Id. at 524.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 524–25.
92. Id. at 525.
93. Id. at 522.
94. Id. at 526.
95. Id. at 526–27 (citations omitted).
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of the jail where Mr. Logue died, so the United States could not be liable
for the conduct of the independent contractor.96
As the federal government relies more and more on for-profit prison
operators, this exception to the FTCA has resulted increasingly in the
government’s evasion of liability for harms suffered by people in its
custody. This reality is distinct from the liability of state and local
governments who delegate the function of incarceration to third parties,
particularly in states that have recognized an express non-delegable duty
of care to those people whom they incarcerate.
III. INCARCERATION AS A GOVERNMENT FUNCTION, MEDICAL CARE AS
A NONDELEGABLE DUTY
A. States’ Non-Delegable Duty to Provide Medical Care to Prisoners
Several states, including North Carolina, Washington, and Arizona,
have recognized a non-delegable duty of the government to provide
adequate medical care to the people whom it incarcerates.97 Courts in other
states have similarly recognized a duty of care with respect to incarceration
and private contractors, including for-profit prison medical providers.98
96. Id. at 530.
But we are not persuaded that employees of a contractor with the
Government, whose physical performance is not subject to governmental
supervision, are to be treated as ‘acting on behalf of’ a federal agency
simply because they are performing tasks that would otherwise be
performed by salaried employees of the Government. If this were to be
the law, the exclusion of contractors from the definition of ‘Federal
agency’ in § 2671 would be virtually meaningless, since it would be a
rare situation indeed in which an independent contractor with the
Government would be performing tasks that would not otherwise be
performed by salaried Government employees.
Id. at 531–32.
97. Medley v. North Carolina Dep’t of Correction, 412 S.E. 2d 654, 659 (N.C.
1992); Harrelson v. Dupnik, 970 F. Supp. 2d 953 (D. Ariz. 2013) (applying
DeMontiney v. Desert Manor Convalescent Center, Inc., 695 P.2d 255 (1985) to
the incarceration setting); Shea v. City of Spokane, 562 P.2d 264 (Wash Ct. App.
1977), aff’d, 578 P.2d 42 (Wash. 1978).
98. See, e.g., Estate of Lovern v. Correct Care Solutions, LLC, No. 18-cv02573-KLM, 2019 WL 2903589 (D. Colo., July 3, 2019).
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has not yet formally adopted the
non-delegable duty doctrine. Nonetheless, to the extent that the County
Defendants claim the doctrine is not well-established and should not be
applied here, the Court disagrees. The non-delegable duty doctrine has
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The Supreme Court of North Carolina, for example, held in 1992 that
the state’s duty to provide adequate medical care to prisoners in its custody
is non-delegable and the state cannot avoid liability by contracting with
private companies to provide such services, including incarceration as a
whole.99 In Medley v. North Carolina Department of Correction, the
plaintiff, Mr. Medley, filed a medical negligence claim against the
Department of Corrections (DOC) under the North Carolina Tort Claims
Act, a statutory scheme roughly parallel to the FTCA.100 Mr. Medley
alleged that he developed a foot infection, which the prison doctor failed
to adequately treat, leading to the development of “diabetic gangrene” and
the amputation of Mr. Medley’s leg below the knee.101 The prison doctor
was a contract physician paid by the state to provide medical services for
prisoners in one prison.102
Similar to the FTCA, the North Carolina Tort Claims Act
encompasses claims arising from the negligence of any state officer,
employee, or agent.103 The court noted that the state legislature had not
defined “agent”104 and then went on to analyze Mr. Medley’s tort claim
against the DOC on the theory that the contracted prison doctor was an
“agent” of the state “as a matter of law” due to the state’s “nondelegable
duty to provide adequate medical care for persons it incarcerates.”105 This
sort of nondelegable duty, the court explained, arises out of situations in
which “a person’s duty [is] so important and so preemptory” that its
obligations cannot be transferred to another.106 The situations involve
“responsibility [that] is so important to the community” and obligations
that “are of such importance” that entities “should not be able to escape
liability merely by hiring others to perform them.”107 The court compared
the level of care a government owes to those whom it incarcerates to the
been applied several times in this District very recently, with the court in
each case finding that the doctrine provides a viable theory of indirect
liability against a municipality in circumstances similar to those found
here.
Id. at *4.
99. Medley v. North Carolina Dep’t of Correction, 412 S.E. 2d 654, 659 (N.C.
1992).
100. Id. at 655.
101. Id. at 656.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 657.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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level of care a parent owes to his children: “Just as a minor child is, relative
to his adult parents, less able to care for himself, so is a prison inmate who
is prevented from seeking medical care outside the prison less able to care
for himself than are his custodians.”108 The court concluded: “We hold that
the duty to provide adequate medical care to inmates, imposed by the state
and federal Constitutions, and recognized in state statute and caselaw, is
such a fundamental and paramount obligation of the state that the state
cannot absolve itself of responsibility by delegating to another.”109
The Washington Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion in
Shea v. City of Spokane, which the Washington Supreme Court
affirmed.110 Mr. Shea was incarcerated in the Spokane City jail when he
started to feel nauseous.111 He asked for help but was told there was
nothing that could be done.112 He began to feel worse, but jail staff still
denied him any assessment or treatment.113 At one point, he apparently lost
consciousness and was taken to a hospital where he began complaining of
back pain.114 The back pain continued when he was returned to the jail.115
His condition worsened, and when staff returned him to the hospital,
doctors discovered he had suffered various permanent injuries, including
paralysis.116 Mr. Shea sued the City of Spokane, alleging that city
employees and jail staff, including the jail physician, negligently caused
his injuries, and he won a jury verdict in his favor.117
The City of Spokane appealed the verdict.118 Among the questions
presented on appeal, the city asserted it could not be held liable for the
actions of the jail physician because he was an independent contractor who
was also engaged in private practice.119 The court disagreed, concluding
that the city, “in operating and maintaining a jail, has a twofold duty: one
to the public to keep and produce the prisoner when required, and the other
to the prisoner to keep him in health and safety.”120 This second duty—the
one of the government to keep those who are in its custody healthy and
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
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safe—arises out of the special relationship between the government and
people who are incarcerated: when the state takes a person into its custody,
it deprives that person “of his normal opportunities for protection.”121 The
state exerts “complete control over a prisoner deprived of liberty”122:
[T]he nature of the relationship is such as to render nondelegable
the duty of providing for the health of a prisoner. Stated another
way, the duty is so intertwined with the responsibility of the City
as custodian that it cannot be relieved of liability for the negligent
exercise of that duty by delegating it to an independent contractor
physician.123
Arizona recognizes a similar nondelegable duty of care involving
situations of confinement or commitment, finding it is “in the public
interest that the [government] remain ultimately liable for any breach of
that very important duty” to provide care to people in its custody.124
For these states, the act of incarceration—which renders a person in
the near-complete control of the government and, therefore, virtually
incapable of providing for her own health and safety—imposes a special
duty on the government. That special duty is one that the government
cannot evade simply by delegating it to another party. This nondelegable
duty arises from the inherently governmental function of incarceration.
B. Incarceration as a Federal Government Function
In principle, incarceration is an inherently constitutional—or public—
function.125 That is, from a moral, philosophical, and legal view, depriving
a person of his liberty is something only a government may rightfully do.
Delegating that coercive power and the responsibilities that come with it
“represents the government’s abdication of one of its most basic
responsibilities to its people.”126 Indeed, delegating this necessarily public
function with few mechanisms in place to hold the private actors
accountable eviscerates the oversight and accountability structure inherent
121. Id.
122. Id. at 267–68.
123. Id. at 268.
124. Harrelson v. Dupnik, 970 F. Supp. 2d 953, 974 (2013) (quoting
DeMontiney v. Desert Manor Convalescent Center, Inc., 695 P.2d 255 (1985)).
125. See, e.g., Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55
DUKE L.J. 437, 442–43 (2005) (compiling literature among private-prison critics
relying on incarceration and punishment as inherently public function).
126. Joseph E. Field, Making Prisons Private: An Improper Delegation of a
Governmental Power, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 649, 668 (1987).
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to the United States’ system of government, with co-equal branches of
government imposing checks and balances on each other in furtherance of
adhering to constitutional standards and norms. By relying on the FTCA’s
independent-contractor exception and not recognizing a non-delegable
duty of care, the government evades judicial review of, and responsibility
for, one of its core functions.
C. A Federal Nondelegable Duty of Care
There is no meaningful difference between the power of state and local
governments to incarcerate people within their jurisdictions and the power
of the federal government to incarcerate people within its jurisdiction.
People in the federal government’s custody are in the government’s
near-complete control and depend in virtually every way on the
government to provide for their health and safety—in the same ways as
people in the custody of North Carolina, Washington, Arizona, and the
other states that recognize a nondelegable duty of care. Yet, the FTCA’s
independent-contractor exception permits the federal government to
delegate the duty it owes to the people whom it incarcerates.127 This
delegation of duty often means that claims against the government for
inadequate medical care in private prisons or carried out by private parties
evade review.
The obvious fix to this problem is one for Congress. Although the
FTCA generally maps onto state tort law, its definition of the actors whose
conduct subjects the federal government to liability contains no exceptions
for non-governmental actors carrying out an otherwise nondelegable
duty.128 The Supreme Court has called this a “congressional choice”:
127. This is despite the existence of a federal statute obligating the federal
government to “provide for the safekeeping, care, and subsistence of all persons
charged with or convicted of offenses against the United States.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 4042(a)(2) (2019).
128. Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521, 528 (1973).
Petitioners cite to the commentary to the Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 409 (1965), to the effect that the common-law distinction that shields
the employer from liability for injuries caused to another by the negligent
act of a contractor or his servant is subject to so many exceptions that it
is the general rule ‘only in the sense that it is applied where no good
reason is found for departing from it.’ Congress, of course, could have
left the determination as to whose negligence the Government should be
liable for under the Federal Tort Claims Act to the law of the State
involved, as it did with other aspects of liability under the Act. But it
chose not to do this, and instead incorporated into the definitions of the
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“While this congressional choice leaves the courts free to look to the law
of torts and agency to define ‘contractor,’ it does not leave them free to
abrogate the exemption [for independent contractors] that the Act
provides.”129
Accordingly, it is up to Congress to make another choice—to enact
legislation to hold the federal government to the same nondelegable duty
of care that states and local governments hold themselves to with respect
to providing for the health and safety of incarcerated people. Revising the
FTCA’s definitional provision is the clearest place to begin and may
require only striking from the definition of federal agency “any contractor
with the United States.”130 Without the express independent-contractor
exception, state tort and agency principles would apply and, in the many
states that have a recognized nondelegable duty of care, the federal
government may be liable for the wrongful actions of its contractors.
Legislating an express nondelegable duty of care on the federal level
would shore up any doubts as to the government’s liability, particularly in
the states that may not have as robust law on the subject as others.
CONCLUSION
The FTCA has been called the federal government’s most expansive
waiver of sovereign immunity to date. But it contains shortfalls. The law’s
independent-contractor exception leaves the people whom the federal
government incarcerates in private prisons without a remedy against the
government for harms they suffer within the private prison or at the hands
of private-prison employees. This is in contrast to those people’s
counterparts in government-run prisons at the federal, state, and local
levels. These disparities in available rights and remedies restrict the ability
of many incarcerated people to address past violations of their rights and
mitigate the often harsh conditions in which the federal government
incarcerates people. The restrictions also hamper the means by which many
accounts of the conditions of American incarceration are disseminated to the
public, leaving much of what happens behind prisons’ walls, locked inside
with the people who are confined.
Congress must provide a legislative fix to its predecessor’s legislative
“choice” to exempt the federal government from liability for the wrongful
acts of independent contractors that carry out its inherently governmental
Act the exemption from liability for injury caused by employees of a
contractor.

Id.
129. Id.
130. See 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (2019).
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function of incarceration. As the privatization of incarceration proliferates
on the federal level, the federal government seeks more often to evade
courts’ review of its, and its delegates’, conduct and treatment of people
in its care—people who are in the government’s near-complete control and
are unable to exercise virtually any choice over their medical care or
provide for their own safety. The government is the only entity that may
lawfully deprive a person of her liberty; the government must remain
accountable to the people in its care.
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